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Abstract
We consider the problem of optimal risk sharing of some given total risk be-
tween two economic agents characterized by law-invariant monetary utility functions
or equivalently, law-invariant risk measures. We ﬁrst prove existence of an optimal risk
sharing allocation which is in addition increasing in terms of the total risk. We next
provide an explicit characterization in the case where both agents’ utility functions are
comonotone. The general form of the optimal contracts turns out to be given by a sum
of options (stop-loss contracts, in the language of insurance) on the total risk. In order
to show the robustness of this type of contracts to more general utility functions, we
introduce a new notion of strict risk aversion conditionally on lower tail events, which
is typically satisﬁed by the semi-deviation and the entropic risk measures. Then, in
the context of an AV@R-agent facing an agent with strict monotone preferences and
exhibiting strict risk aversion conditional on lower tail events, we prove that optimal
contracts again are European options on the total risk.
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11 Introduction
The problem of optimal sharing of risk between two agents has been considered by many
authors, starting from Arrow [1], Borch [9], B¨ uhlmann [7], B¨ uhlmann and Jewell [8], see
also Gerber [26]. The main motivation was the application to insurance problems. For an
extensive list of references, we refer to the recent paper by Dana and Scarsini [15] and the
second edition of the book by F¨ ollmer and Schied [25]. The general setting of the problem
is the following. The initial risk endowments of the agents are deﬁned by the bounded
random variables X0 and X1, so that the aggregate risk is given by X := X0 + X1. An
allocation (ξ0,ξ1), with ξ0+ξ1 = X, is called an optimal risk sharing if it is Pareto optimal
and satisﬁes the individual rationality constraint, i.e. none of the agents experiences a loss
of utility by passing from Xi to ξi.
The purpose of this paper is to obtain an explicit characterization of the optimal risk
sharing in the context of monetary utility functions, see Deﬁnition 2.1 below. Up to the
sign, monetary utility functions are identical to convex risk measures [24, 21], a popular
notion in particular since the Basel II accord. Indeed, U is a monetary utility function
if and only if ρ = −U is a convex risk measure in the sense of F¨ ollmer and Schied [24],
Frittelli and Rosazza-Gianin [21]. We shall rather use the language of monetary utility
functions in order to embed our analysis in the setting of classical utility theory. Our
framework is mainly motivated by Barrieu and El Karoui [3, 4, 5, 6] who showed that,
when the agents’ utilities are given by Ui(ξ) := γ−1
i U(γiξ) for some γi > 0 and some
monetary utility function U, the optimal risk sharing rule is proportional to the aggregate
risk. We also refer to Heath and Ku [27] for analyzing Pareto optimal risk between banks
deﬁned by coherent risk measures in a ﬁnite probability space.
In comparison to the general utility theory, the setting of monetary utility functions
induces a remarkable simpliﬁcation, as it induces a clear separation between the Pareto
optimality and the individual rationality constraints which deﬁne an optimal risk sharing
rule. Pareto optimal allocations are deﬁned up to a constant, and their characterization
reduces to the calculation of the sup-convolution of the utility functions, as observed in
[3]. As a second independent step, the choice of the constant, or the premium, inside
the interval of reservation prices of the agents then characterizes all optimal risk sharing
allocations.
In this paper, we specialize further the class of monetary utility functions by assuming
the law-invariance property. Under this condition, we prove that the set of optimal risk
sharing allocations is not empty. We next derive an explicit characterization of optimal
risk sharing allocations in two concrete settings :
(i) When the preferences of both agents are deﬁned by comonotone law-invariant utility
functions (a typical example being U = −AV @Rα to be discussed below), a precise de-
2scription of the optimal risk sharing rule is provided. The key-ingredient is the quantile
representation of Kusuoka [32] which is further extended in [22], [25] and [29]. We prove
that Pareto optimal allocations are given by sums of European options (“stop-loss con-
tracts” or simply “deductibles” in the insurance terminology) written on the aggregate
risk X. We observe that this setting is intimately connected to the context of convex
distorsions of probability as studied in Carlier and Dana [12].
(ii) As a second example, we ﬁx some α ∈ (0,1), and we assume that the utility of Agent
0 is deﬁned by U0 = −AV @Rα, where AV @Rα is the so-called average value at risk or
expected shortfall risk measure. This is the prime example of a comonotone monetary
utility function. Agent 1 is deﬁned by a law-invariant monetary utility function which is
strictly monotone. We further assume that Agent 1 is strictly risk averse conditionally on
lower tail events. This notion is deﬁned in Section 3. Loosely speaking, it states that the
agent has a strict preference for averaging lower tail events of risk. The class of monetary
utility functions which satisfy these two conditions include the so-called entropic utility
and the semi-deviation utility (see e.g. [23]). We remark that U0 = −AV @Rα is neither
strictly monotone, nor strictly risk averse conditionally on lower tail events. In the above
setting, we show that Pareto optimal allocations are deﬁned by classical options : Agent 0
oﬀers a stop-loss contract deﬁned by a threshold κ, and leaves Agent 1 with the aggregate
risk capped at the level κ, i.e. (ξ0,ξ1) = (−(X − κ)−,κ ∨ X). In particular this shows that
Agent 0 takes the extremal risks, and that the AV@R measure of risk is not so prudent.
We believe that the above stated results provide an additional justiﬁcation for the ex-
istence of options in ﬁnancial markets, and stop-loss contracts, deductibles and layers in
insurance markets.
We conclude this introduction by pointing out the importance of the concavity of the
utility function. It was stressed in [2] that the V@R criterion for risk measuring leads
to incoherent results because of the lack of sub-additivity. The present context of risk
sharing provides another result in this direction. Indeed, let Agent 1 be deﬁned by
any monetary utility function. Assuming that Agent 0 is deﬁned by the utility function
U0 = −V @Rα(X), it follows clearly that the level of the random variable on the event set
{X < V@Rα(X)} is not relevant for this agent. Then, an optimal risk sharing allocation
consists in endorsing her any large amount of risk on the event set {X < V@Rα(X)} ! In
other words, the V @Rα−agent endorses an inﬁnite amount of risk with positive proba-
bility. Hence the very question of optimal risk sharing leads to silly results if one of the
agents uses the V@R criterion as a measure of risk.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 collects some notions on monetary utility
functions. Our main results are stated in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the charac-
terization of the optimal sharing allocations when both agents are deﬁned by comonotone
law-invariant monetary utility functions. In Section 5, we focus on the notion of strict
3risk aversion, conditional on lower tail events, together with its implications in terms of
risk sharing. Finally, we report the existence of optimal risk sharing allocations under
law-invariant monetary utility functions in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries : utility functions and related notions
Throughout this paper, we work on a standard probability space (Ω,F,P), i.e. we suppose
that (Ω,F,P) has no atoms and that L2(Ω,F,P) is separable. For every p ∈ [0,∞], we
shall denote by Lp(P) the collection of all real-valued random variables with ﬁnite Lp norm
under P. Here, L0 := L0(P) consists of all real-valued F−measurable random variables,
and L∞ := L∞(P) is the subset of all essentially bounded elements in L0.
For every random variable ξ with values in R, we denote its cumulative distribution
function by Fξ(x) := P[ξ ≤ x], and its generalized inverse (called quantile function) by
qξ(α) = inf {x : Fξ(x) ≥ α} for α ∈ [0,1].
Given two random variables ξ and ζ, we shall write ξ =d ζ to indicate equality in
distribution.
For a bounded ﬁnitely additive measure µ ∈ (L∞)
∗, we denote by  µ ba its total mass.
Given a sub-σ-algebra G of F, we deﬁne the conditional expectation (L∞)∗ ∋ µ  −→
E[µ|G] ∈ (L∞)∗ as the transpose of the G−conditional expectation operator on L∞, i.e.
 E[µ|G],ξ  =  µ,E[ξ|G]  for all µ ∈ (L∞)∗ and ξ ∈ L∞. If the singular part of µ is zero,
i.e. µ is absolutely continuous with respect to P with density dµ/dP = Z, then it is
immediately checked that this deﬁnition coincides with the classical notion of condition
expectation in the sense that E[µ|G] = E[Z|G] · P.
Let E be a Banach space with dual E∗. Given a function f : E −→ R, its sub-gradient
and super-gradients are respectively denoted by
∂−f(x) := {x∗ ∈ E∗ : f(y) ≥ f(x) +  x∗,y − x  for every y ∈ E} ,
∂+f(x) := {x∗ ∈ E∗ : f(y) ≤ f(x) +  x∗,y − x  for every y ∈ E} .
When f is convex (resp. concave), we shall simply denote ∂f := ∂−f (resp. ∂f := ∂+f).
2.1 Monetary utility functions
We say that a function f : L∞ −→ [−∞,∞] is proper if dom(U) := {ξ ∈ L∞ : U(ξ) ∈ R}
is non-empty.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A proper function U : L∞ −→ R is called a monetary utility function if it
is concave, monotone with respect to the order of L∞, satisﬁes the normalization condition
4U(0) = 0 and has the cash-invariance property
U(ξ + c) = U(ξ) + c for every ξ ∈ L∞ and c ∈ R.
Observe that the cash invariance and the monotonicity of U imply that U is ﬁnite and
Lipschitz-continuous on L∞. In particular, the normalization U(0) = 0 does not restrict
the generality as it may be obtained by adding a constant to U.
Monetary utility functions can be identiﬁed with convex risk measures by the formula
ρ(ξ) = −U(ξ). In particular, positively homogeneous monetary utility functions can be
identiﬁed with coherent risk measures, introduced in Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath [2],
while the general notion of monetary utility functions corresponds to convex risk measures
as introduced independently by F¨ ollmer and Schied [24], and Frittelli and Rossaza-Gianin
[21]. We shall frequently use the conjugate function
V (µ) := sup
ξ∈L∞
(U(ξ) −  µ,ξ ) ∈ R ∪ {∞}, µ ∈ (L∞)∗ ,
which is convex and lower semi-continuous with respect to σ ((L∞)∗,L∞). From classical
convex duality theory, see e.g. [10], and the L∞−continuity of U, it follows that U and V
are  L∞,(L∞)∗ −conjugate, i.e.
U(ξ) = inf
µ∈(L∞)∗ (V (µ) +  µ,ξ ) for every ξ ∈ L∞ .
We shall denote by V 1 the restriction of V to L1(P), and remark that its domain is included
in the set of densities of P-absolutely continuous probability measures, i.e.
dom(V 1) :=
￿





+(P) : E[Z] = 1
￿
.(2.1)
Theorem 2.1 ([19, 24]). For a monetary utility function U, the following statements are
equivalent :
(i) U and V 1 are  L∞,L1(P) −conjugate, i.e. U(ξ) = infZ∈L1(P)
￿









(iii) U has the Fatou property, i.e. for every L∞−bounded sequence (ξn)n≥1 converging in
probability to some ξ ∈ L∞, we have U(ξ) ≥ limsupn U(ξn).
Remark 2.1. Assuming the Fatou property, suppose that a monetary utility function U
is positively homogeneous, i.e. U(ξ) = −ρ(ξ) for some coherent risk measure ρ. Then, the
conjugate function V is zero on its domain, and U(X) = infZ∈dom(V 1) E[ZX].
Given two monetary utility functions U0 and U1, we denote by
U0￿U1(ξ) := sup
ξ0∈L∞
U0(ξ0) + U1(ξ − ξ0), ξ ∈ L∞ ,
5the sup-convolution of the concave functions U0 and U1 (compare [18, 6]). It is well known
that U0￿U1 is a concave function on L∞, see e.g. [36, 18]. Since U0 and U1 are ﬁnite on
L∞, it follows that U0￿U1 > −∞. Then, it follows from the concavity of U0￿U1 that
either dom(U0￿U1) = L∞ , or U0￿U1 ≡ ∞.
For later use, we provide the following well-known properties and their proof for complete-
ness, see e.g. [6].
Lemma 2.1. Let U0 and U1 be two concave functions from L∞ to R with associated
convex conjugate functions V0 and V1 deﬁned on (L∞)∗, and assume that U0￿U1 is
L∞−continuous. Then:
(i) dom(U0￿U1) = L∞ if and only if dom(V0) ∩ dom(V1)  = ∅. In this case, U0￿U1 is a
monetary utility function.
(ii) if U0￿U1 is proper, then U0￿U1 and V0 + V1 are σ (L∞)∗,L∞ −conjugate.
Proof. Assertion (i) is an immediate consequence of (ii). To see that (ii) holds true, we
compute, similarly as in [3], that for every µ ∈ (L∞)∗ :
sup
ξ∈L∞




(U0(ξ0) + U1(ξ − ξ0) −  µ,ξ )
= sup
ξ0,ξ1∈L∞
(U0(ξ0) −  µ,ξ0 + ξ1  + U1(ξ1)) = (V0 + V1)(µ).
Hence V0+V1 is the  (L∞)∗,L∞ −conjugate of the upper-semicontinuous function U0￿U1.
If U0￿U1 is proper, then (ii) follows from classical convex duality theory. ✷
Remark 2.2. Given two monetary utility functions satisfying the Fatou property, notice
that there is no guarantee in general for U0￿U1 to satisfy the Fatou property, see the
counter-example reported in Delbaen [20] which we analyze in more detail in Section
6.3 below. Hence, in general, U0￿U1 is not the conjugate of V 1
0 + V 1
1 , where V 1
i is the
restriction of Vi to L1(P), for i = 0,1.
2.2 Law-invariance
A function f : L∞ −→ R is said to be law-invariant if f(ξ) depends only on the law of ξ
for every ξ ∈ L∞.
Let U be a law-invariant monetary utility function and ξ ∈ L∞. By Lemma 3.2 of [29],
E[ξ] lies in the σ ((L∞)∗,L∞)−closed convex hull of the set {ζ ∈ L∞ : ζ =d ξ}. Then,
it follows from the concavity and the law-invariance of U that U (E[ξ]) ≥ U(ξ) for any
ξ ∈ L∞, and therefore V (1) ≤ 0. Since U(0) = 0, this implies that
1 ∈ dom(V ) and V (1) = 0. (2.2)
In particular, it follows from Lemma 2.1 that dom(U0￿U1) = L∞ for any pair (U0,U1) of
law-invariant monetary utility functions.
6Remark 2.3. This is a complement to Remark 2.2. Given two law-invariant monetary
utility functions U0 and U1, we know from Lemma 2.1 and (2.2) that U0￿U1 is a monetary
utility function. Clearly, U0￿U1 is law-invariant, so it has the Fatou property by [29].
Consequently U0￿U1 and V 1






An interesting characterization of law-invariant monetary utility functions, obtained by
Kusuoka [32] and further extended in [22] and [29] (Theorem 2.1 and equation (14)),
expresses any law-invariant coherent risk measure in terms of the quantile function. An
important role is played by the set
Dց := {g ∈ D : g non-increasing, right-continuous and g(1) = 0}
where D :=
n
g : (0,1] −→ R+,
R 1
0 g = 1
o
is the set of density functions on (0,1].
Theorem 2.2 ([32, 22, 29]). The following statements are equivalent :
(i) U is a law-invariant monetary utility function,




qξ(t)f(t)dt + v(f) for every ξ ∈ L∞ .
For the purpose of this paper, it is convenient to introduce the set of primitive functions
Cց :=
￿
ϕ : [0,1] −→ [0,1] : ϕ(t) =
Z t
0
g(s)ds for some g ∈ Dց
￿
and its pointwise closure
Cց = {ϕ : [0,1] −→ [0,1] non-decreasing, concave, ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ(1) = 1} .
Clearly, Cց is the subset of all functions in Cց which are continuous at the point t = 0.
Then, by a direct rephrasing of Theorem 2.2, we obtain a characterization of any law-




qξ(t)ϕ′(t)dt + v(ϕ) = inf
ϕ∈Cց
Z
qξ(t)ϕ′(t)dt + v(ϕ) (2.3)
for every ξ ∈ L∞, where v : Cց −→ R+ ∪ {∞} is a convex function with infCց v = 0. In
the second equality of (2.3), ϕ′ = ϕ(0+)δ0 +ϕ′1(0,1] in the distributional sense, so that ϕ′
assigns a positive mass to the point t = 0 whenever ϕ ∈ Cց is not continuous at this point
(see Remark 2.4 below).
2.3 Comonotonicity
Deﬁnition 2.2. Let (ξ,ζ) be a pair of random variables deﬁned on (Ω,F,P), with values
in R.
7(i) ξ and ζ are comonotone, and we denote ξ ∼c ζ, if (ξ(ω1) − ξ(ω2))(ζ(ω1) − ζ(ω2)) ≥ 0
P(dω) ⊗ P(dω′)−a.s.
(ii) ξ increases with ζ, and we denote ξրζ, if ξ = ϕ(ζ) for some non-decreasing map ϕ.
These two notions are equivalent for diﬀuse random variables ξ and ζ. Clearly ξ ∼c ζ
whenever ξրζ. The converse does not hold true, in general. However, ξ ∼c ζ if and only
if ξրη and ζրη for some random variable η deﬁned on (Ω,F,P). We shall also use the
Denneberg’s lemma [16] which states that ξ ∼c ζ if and only if ξր(ξ + ζ) and ζր(ξ + ζ).
We refer to [17] for an overview on these concepts.
Deﬁnition 2.3. A function f : L∞ −→ R is said to be comonotone if f(ξ+ζ) = f(ξ)+f(ζ)
for every pair (ξ,ζ) of comonotone random variables in L∞.
Notice that any comonotone function on L∞ is positively homogeneous. The following
result from [32] (see also [25] and [29]) provides a reduction of the quantile representation
of Theorem 2.2 to the case of comonotone law-invariant utility functions.
Theorem 2.3 ([32]). Let U be a law-invariant monetary utility function. Then, the
following statements are equivalent :
(i) U is comonotone
(ii) there is a (unique) function ¯ ϕ ∈ Cց such that, with the notations of (2.3), dom(v) =
{ϕ ∈ Cց : ϕ ≤ ¯ ϕ}, v = 0 on dom(v), and for every ξ ∈ L∞ :
U(ξ) =
Z
qξ(t)¯ ϕ′(t)dt = inf
￿Z
qξ(t)ϕ′(t)dt : ϕ ∈ Cց and ϕ ≤ ¯ ϕ
￿
.
Proof. Observe that the set {ϕ ∈ Cց : ϕ ≤ ¯ ϕ} is closed and convex. Then, since comono-
tonicity implies that U is positively homogeneneous and satisﬁes the Fatou property, see
[25] and [29], the proposition is just a restatement from [32]. ✷
Example 2.1. Let ¯ gα := α−11[0,α), and ¯ ϕα(t) :=
R t
0 ¯ gα(s)ds, for some α ∈ (0,1). Then,





corresponds to the so-called average value at risk, or expected shortfall, with parameter α.
Remark 2.4. Let U be a comonotone law-invariant monetary utility function with asso-
ciated concave function ¯ ϕ ∈ Cց. Set µ := ¯ ϕ(0+), and ¯ ϕ∗ := (1 − µ)−1 (¯ ϕ − µ) on [0,1].
Then ¯ ϕ∗ ∈ Cց, and




Hence the possible jump of ¯ ϕ at the point t = 0 means that U(ξ) is aﬀected by ess−inf ξ.
8We conclude this section by the following explicit calculation of the sup-convolution for
two comonotone law-invariant monetary utility functions.
Lemma 2.2. Let U0 and U1 be two comonotone law-invariant monetary utility functions,
and let ¯ ϕ0, ¯ ϕ1 ∈ Cց be the associated functions in the representation (2.3). Then U0￿U1 is




qξ(t)(¯ ϕ0 ∧ ¯ ϕ1)′(t)dt for every ξ ∈ L∞ .
Proof. For a concave function ϕ : [0,1] −→ [0,1], we introduce the subsets Cϕ :=
￿
Z ∈ L1(P) :
R . qZ ∈ Cց and
R . qZ ≤ ϕ
￿
. Observe that Cϕ is closed convex in L1(P).
By Remark 2.3, the functions Ui and V 1
i = χC¯ ϕi are  L∞,L1(P) −conjugate, where χ is
the indicator function in the sense of convex analysis. Then, we directly compute that
V 1
0 +V 1
1 = χC¯ ϕ0 +χC¯ ϕ1 = χC¯ ϕ0∩C¯ ϕ1 = χC¯ ϕ0∧¯ ϕ1. The proof is completed by recalling from
Remark 2.3 that U0￿U1 and V 1
0 + V 1
1 are conjugate. ✷
3 Optimal risk sharing under law-invariant monetary utility
3.1 Pareto optimal allocations
We consider two agents i = 0,1. Each agent is characterized by a monetary utility function
Ui, and is endowed with an initial risk Xi ∈ L∞. The aggregate risk endowment is denoted
by
X := X0 + X1 .
We ﬁrst recall some classical notions from economic theory, see e.g. Gerber [26]. The
aﬃne space
A(X) := {(ξ0,ξ1) ∈ L∞ × L∞ : ξ0 + ξ1 = X}
is called the set of attainable allocations. This is the collection of all possible sharings of
the aggregate risk X between both agents.
Deﬁnition 3.1. Let (ξ0,ξ1) be an attainable allocation in A(X). We say that (ξ0,ξ1) is
Pareto optimal if for all (ζ0,ζ1) ∈ A(X) :
U0(ζ0) ≥ U0(ξ0) and U1(ζ1) ≥ U1(ξ1) =⇒ U0(ζ0) = U0(ξ0) and U1(ζ1) = U1(ξ1).
The well-known concept of Pareto optimal allocations describes the possible candidates
for an optimal way of risk sharing. Indeed if (ξ0,ξ1) fails to be Pareto-optimal, one may
ﬁnd a pair (ζ0,ζ1) such that both agents are better of, and at least one of them is strictly
better.
9Remark 3.1. In the context of monetary utility functions, notice that
1. Pareto optimal allocations are only deﬁned up to a constant, i.e. given a Pareto optimal
allocation (ξ0,ξ1), the attainable allocation (ξ0 +c,ξ1 −c) is also Pareto optimal for every
c ∈ R,
2. Let (ξ0,ξ1) be an attainable allocation which is not Pareto optimal. Then, we can always
ﬁnd a Pareto optimal allocation (ζ0,ζ1) such that U0(ζ0) > U0(ξ0) and U1(ζ1) > U1(ξ1);
this follows immediately from the cash invariance of U0 and U1.
The key-ingredient for the characterization of Pareto optimal allocations is the following.
Theorem 3.1. Let U0 and U1 be two monetary utility functions with associated convex
conjugate functions V0 and V1 deﬁned on (L∞)
∗. For a given aggregate risk X ∈ L∞ and
(ξ0,ξ1) ∈ A(X), the following statements are equivalent :
(i) (ξ0,ξ1) is a Pareto optimal allocation,
(ii) U0￿U1(X) = U0 (ξ0) + U1 (ξ1),
(iii) Ui(ξi) = Vi(µ) +  µ,ξi , i = 0,1, for some µ ∈ (L∞)∗,
(iv) −ξi ∈ ∂Vi(µ), i = 0,1, for some µ ∈ (L∞)
∗,
(v) ∂U0(ξ0) ∩ ∂U1(ξ1)  = ∅.
If U0 and U1 are in addition law-invariant, then any of the above assertions holds iﬀ
(vi)
￿¯ ξ0, ¯ ξ1
￿
:= (E[ξ0|X],E[ξ1|X]) ∈ A(X) is a Pareto optimal allocation and Ui(¯ ξi) =
Ui(ξi), for i = 0,1.
Proof. The equivalences (ii)-(v) are known duality results, even in a more general dynamic
context, see Kl¨ oppel and Schweizer [31]. The connection with (i) is a classical result in
economic theory, see e.g. [13]. Equivalence with (vi) in the law-invariant context is new.
For completeness, we report the proof of all equivalences.
(iii) ⇐⇒ (iv) ⇐⇒ (v) hold true by deﬁnition of the convex conjugate, and the Fenchel
duality relation.
(ii) ⇐⇒ (iii) Let µ ∈ ∂(U0￿U1)(X). Following the argument of Theorem 10 in [6], we
compute that
U0￿U1(X) =  µ,X  + V0(µ) + V1(µ)
=  µ,X  + sup
ξ∈L∞
(U0(ξ) −  µ,ξ ) + sup
ξ∈L∞
(U1(X − ξ) −  µ,X − ξ )
= sup
ξ∈L∞
(U0(ξ) −  µ,ξ ) + sup
ξ∈L∞
(U1(X − ξ) +  µ,ξ )
≥ sup
ξ∈L∞
(U0(ξ) + U1(X − ξ)) = U0￿U1(X).
Hence U0￿U1(X) = U0(ξ0) + U1(X − ξ0) if and only if V0(µ) = U0(ξ0) −  µ,ξ0  and
V1(µ) = U1(X − ξ0) −  µ,X − ξ0 .
(ii) =⇒ (i) is trivial, and (i) =⇒ (ii) Let (ξ0,ξ1) be a Pareto optimal allocation, and
consider the sets ˜ B := {(U0(ζ0),U1(ζ1)) : (ζ0,ζ1) ∈ A(X)}, B := ˜ B − R2






. It is immediately checked that B and C are non-empty
convex subsets of R2 with non-empty interior, and B ∩ C = ∅ by the Pareto optimality
of (ξ0,ξ1). By the Hahn-Banach separation Theorem, there exists λ ∈ R2 \ {0} such that
λ · y ≤ λ · z for all (y,z) ∈ B × C. Since (U0(ξ0),U1(ξ1)) ∈ B, (U0(ξ0) + 1,U1(ξ1)) ∈ C
and (U0(ξ0),U1(ξ1) + 1) ∈ C, we deduce from the separation inequality that λi ≥ 0 for
i = 0,1. It then follows from the separation inequality that (ξ0,ξ1) is a maximizer of
λ0U0(ζ0) + λ1U1(ζ1) over (ζ0,ζ1) ∈ A(X). Finally, the cash-invariance properties of U0
and U1 imply that λ0 = λ1.
(vi) =⇒ (i) is trivial. To see that (i) =⇒ (vi) for comonotone U0,U1, we recall from
Lemma 3.2 in [29] that E[ξi|X] lies in the σ ((L∞)∗,L∞)−closed convex hull of the set
{ζ ∈ L∞ : ζ =d ξi}. Then, it follows from the concavity and the law-invariance of Ui that
Ui (E[ξi|X]) ≥ Ui(ξi). ✷
The characterization (ii) in the above Theorem 3.1 has a well-known extension for general
utility functions (see e.g. [26]), which involves two Lagrange multipliers (simply leaving out
the last sentence in the above proof of (i)=⇒(ii)). In the general case, the Pareto optimal
allocations are characterized as the pairs (ξ∗
0(λ), ξ∗
1(λ)) such that (λ0U0)￿(λ1U1)(X) =
λ0U0 (ξ0(λ)) + λ1U1 (ξ∗
1(λ)), for some λ = (λ0,λ1) ∈ R2
+ \ {0}. It is remarkable that the
cash-invariance property reduces the set of such Lagrange multipliers to λ0 = λ1, and
leads to the sup-convolution U0￿U1.
Remark 3.2. The equivalences (ii)⇐⇒(iii)⇐⇒(iv)⇐⇒(v) in Theorem 3.1 hold true for
general concave proper functions U0 and U1. The monotonicity and the cash invariant
properties assumed in the statement of the theorem are only needed in order to connect
these properties to (i).
3.2 The existence result
Let Aր(X) := {(ξ0,ξ1) ∈ A(X) : ξ0 ր X and ξ1 ր X} be the subset of admissible allo-
cations which increase with the corresponding aggregate risk. By the Denneberg’s lemma
[16], we observe that Aր(X) is the subset of A(X) consisting of all comonotone alloca-
tions. The following result is proved in Section 6, where we also discuss the fact that the
law-invariance assumption can not be dropped.
Theorem 3.2. Let U0 and U1 be two law-invariant monetary utility functions. Then
for every X ∈ L∞, U0￿U1(X) = sup(ξ0,ξ1)∈Aր(X) U0(ξ0) + U1(ξ1), and the set of Pareto
optimal allocations in Aր(X) is non-empty.
Recall from Theorem 3.1 (vi) that any Pareto optimal allocation (ξ0,ξ1) induces a Pareto
optimal allocation (¯ ξ0, ¯ ξ1) = (E[ξ0|X],E[ξ1|X]) which is a measurable function of X. The
above existence result asserts that one may ﬁnd such Pareto optimal allocations which
11increase in X. In general, there is no hope for any uniqueness of Pareto optimal allocations
in this class. To illustrate the situation, we consider a rather trivial example : let Ui(X) =
E[X] for i = 0,1, and consider X = 0. Then any (ξ0,ξ1) ∈ A(X) is Pareto-optimal.
3.3 Two concrete examples
After having established the existence of Pareto optimal allocations, we now give an
explicit characterization of Pareto optimal allocations in Aր(X) for some speciﬁc law-
invariant monetary utility functions. We ﬁrst consider the case where both agents are
deﬁned by comonotone law-invariant monetary utility functions.
Deﬁnition 3.2. Let (ϕ,ψ) be a pair of functions in Cց with ϕ ≤ ψ, and f a non-
decreasing function on [0,1]. We say that f is ﬂat on {ϕ < ψ} if df = 0 a.e. on {ϕ < ψ}
and (f(0+) − f(0))(ϕ − ψ)(0+) = 0.
Proposition 3.1. Assume that the preferences of each agent i = 0,1 are characterized by a
comonotone law-invariant monetary utility function, and let ¯ ϕi ∈ Cց be the corresponding
non-decreasing concave function, as deﬁned in Theorem 2.3. Let X ∈ L∞ be some given
aggregate risk endowment. For (ξ0,ξ1) ∈ Aր(X), the following statements are equivalent :
(i) (ξ0,ξ1) is a Pareto optimal allocation,
(ii) the quantile function qξi is ﬂat on {¯ ϕi > ¯ ϕ1−i} ∩ {dqX > 0}.
The proof of Proposition 3.1 is reported in Section 4. In the context of this result, we
observe that, for a Pareto optimal allocation (ξ0,ξ1) ∈ Aր(X), we have in addition that
qξi is ﬂat on {¯ ϕ0  = ¯ ϕ1} ∩ {dqX = 0}, for i = 0,1.
The following easy application relates this result to options or stop-loss contracts, layers
and deductibles in insurance.














i = 1, (α
j
i,1 ≤ j ≤ Ni) ∈ (0,1)Ni, i = 0,1.
Then the Pareto optimal allocations of Proposition 3.1 correspond to a ﬁnite sum of Eu-




βk(X − ck)+ and ξ1 := X − ξ0 ,
for some integer K and (βk,1 ≤ k ≤ K) ∈ RK.
We next restrict the preferences of Agent 0 to the prime example of comonotone law-
invariant monetary utility function :
U0(X) := −AV@Rα(X), X ∈ L∞ , for some ﬁxed α ∈ (0,1), (3.1)
12where AV@Rα is the average value at risk deﬁned in Example 2.1. As for Agent 1, we
consider a rather general class of law-invariant monetary utility functions U1. We shall
restrict agent 1 to have a strictly monotone utility function, i.e. U1(ξ) > U1(ζ) whenever
ξ−ζ ∈ L∞
+ \{0}, with a strict risk-aversion property to be deﬁned below. Before turning to
the precise deﬁnition of the latter restriction, we state our second main concrete example.
Proposition 3.2. Let U0 be given by (3.1), and let U1 be a law-invariant monetary utility
function. Assume that U1 is strictly monotone and strictly risk averse conditionally on
lower tail events. Let X ∈ L∞ be the aggregate risk endowment. Then there is a unique
(up to a constant) Pareto optimal allocation in Aր(X) deﬁned by
(ξ0,ξ1) :=
￿
−(X − κ)−,X ∨ κ
￿
,
for some κ ∈ R.
The proof of Proposition 3.2 is reported in Section 5. We now explain the notion of risk
aversion involved in its statement.
Deﬁnition 3.3. (i) Let ξ ∈ L∞ and A ∈ F with P[A] > 0. We say that A is a lower
tail-event for ξ, and we denote A ∈ F↓(ξ), if
ess−infA ξ < ess−supA ξ ≤ ess−infAc ξ .
(ii) Let U be a monetary utility function. We say that U is strictly risk-averse conditionally
on lower tail-events if
U(ξ) < U (ξ1Ac + E[ξ|A]1A) for every ξ ∈ L∞ and A ∈ F↓(ξ).
As a matter of illustration, we provide a characterization of the notions of strict mono-
tonicity and strict risk aversion conditionally on lower tail events in the context of comono-
tone law-invariant monetary utility functions. In particular, Lemma 3.1 below, whose
proof is given in Appendix 1, shows that none of these properties is satisﬁed by the utility
function U0 = −AV@Rα.
Lemma 3.1. Let U be a comonotone law-invariant monetary utility function, with asso-
ciated non-decreasing concave function ¯ ϕ ∈ Cց, i.e. U(ξ) =
R 1
0 qξ(t)¯ ϕ′(t)dt for every
ξ ∈ L∞, see Theorem 2.3. Then :
(i) U is strictly risk averse conditionally on lower tail events if and only if ¯ ϕ is not linear
near the origin, i.e. there does not exist c > 0 and ε > 0 such that ¯ ϕ(t) = ct for 0 ≤ t ≤ ε.
(ii) U is strictly monotone if and only if ¯ ϕ(t) < 1 for 0 ≤ t < 1.
133.4 The semi-deviation utility
In this section, we exemplify the previous notions by considering the semi-deviation utility
function :





￿1/p where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞, (3.2)
compare e.g. [23]. Our purpose is to verify that Proposition 3.2 applies to this example
for 1 < p < ∞.
(i) The function U1 of (3.2) deﬁnes a positively homogeneous law-invariant monetary
utility function. Clearly, U1 is comonotone for p = ∞. Observe however that U1 is not
comonotone for p < ∞. For instance, this can be easily checked in the following example.
Let (Ω,F,P) = {[0,1],B,λ}, and consider the comonotone random variables f(t) = t,
g(t) = t2 for every t ∈ [0,1]. Direct computation shows that U1(f + g)  = U1(f) + U1(g)
for p < ∞.
(ii) We now check that the semi-deviation utility function U1 is strictly risk averse condi-
tionally on lower tail events for 1 < p ≤ ∞. To see this, let ξ ∈ L∞, A ∈ F↓(ξ), and set ˜ ξ
:= ξ1Ac + E[ξ|A]1A. Since E˜ ξ = Eξ, we have
U1(˜ ξ) = Eξ − δE
￿￿


















Since z  −→ z
p
− is strictly convex on R− for 1 < p < ∞, and (ξ − Eξ)−1A is not a.s.
constant, it follows from the Jensen inequality that

















The above strict inequality is still valid for the case p = ∞. However, for p = 1, the
semi-deviation utility is not strictly risk averse conditionally on lower tail events. Indeed,
the last strict inequality is turned into an equality for A := {ξ − Eξ ≤ 0} ∈ F↓(ξ).
(iii) Finally, it is easy to check that the semi-deviation utility function U1 of (3.2) is strictly
monotone, except for the case p = ∞, δ = 1.
3.5 The entropic utility
We now show that the result of Proposition 3.2 applies to the popular entropic utility








for ξ ∈ L∞ . (3.3)
14Clearly U1 is strictly monotone. We now show that U1 is strictly risk-averse conditionally
on any event A ∈ F such that ξ is not a.s. constant on A. Indeed, for ξ ∈ L∞ and
¯ ξ := ξ1Ac +E[ξ|A]1A, it follows from the strict convexity of the exponential together with


























3.6 Optimal risk sharing allocations
Deﬁnition 3.4. Let (ξ0,ξ1) be an attainable allocation in A(X). We say that (ξ0,ξ1) is
an optimal risk sharing rule if it is Pareto optimal and satisﬁes the individual rationality
constraint (IR) : Ui(ξi) ≥ Ui(Xi) for i = 0,1.
In the framework of the paradigm of rational expectations, an attainable allocation which
does not satisfy the IR constraint is rejected by one of the two agents, as the exchange of
risk according to such an allocation strictly decreases her utility.
By deﬁnition, any optimal risk sharing rule is a Pareto optimal allocation. The main
goal of this section is to show that a Pareto optimal allocation induces an optimal risk
sharing rule by associating to it a suitable price. Consequently, the explicit Pareto optimal
allocations obtained in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 induce optimal risk sharing rules.
We ﬁrst introduce the following maps from L∞ to R :
p0(ξ) := U0(X0) − U0(X0 − ξ) and p1(ξ) := U1(X1 + ξ) − U1(X1),
which are known as the reservation prices of the agents. Here, p0(ξ) is the minimal price
for which Agent 0 is willing to transfer the amount of wealth ξ to Agent 1, and p1(ξ) is
the maximal price for which Agent 1 is willing to accept receiving the amount of wealth
ξ from Agent 1. Obviously, under the condition (IR) of individual rationality, the agents
can agree to exchange the risk ξ if and only if p0(ξ) ≤ p1(ξ). In the latter case, for
every p ∈ [p0(ξ),p1(ξ)], the allocation (X0 − (ξ − p),X1 + (ξ − p)) ∈ A(X) satisﬁes the
individual rationality condition (IR).
Theorem 3.3. Let U0 and U1 be two monetary utility functions, and let (X0 − ξ∗,X1 + ξ∗)
be a Pareto optimal allocation. Then p0 (ξ∗) ≤ p1 (ξ∗), and (X0 − ξ∗ + p,X1 + ξ∗ − p) is
an optimal risk sharing allocation if and only if the real number p lies in [p0 (ξ∗),p1 (ξ∗)].
15Proof. In view of the discussion preceding the theorem, we only need to show that
p0(ξ∗) ≤ p1(ξ∗). This follows from Theorem 3.1, as
p0(ξ∗) − p1(ξ∗) = [U0(X0) + U1(X1)] − [U0(X0 − ξ∗) + U1(X1 + ξ∗)] ≤ 0.
✷
Theorem 3.3 shows that, when both agents have monetary utility functions, the deter-
mination of an optimal risk sharing allocation reduces to the characterization of a Pareto
optimal allocation (X0 − ξ∗,X1 + ξ∗) in A(X) (which does exist in the law invariant case
by Theorem 3.2). The width
w := p1(ξ∗) − p0(ξ∗) = U0￿U1(X) − U0(X0) − U1(X1)
may be called the rent of risk exchange. Observe that w depends only on X and not on
the choice of the Pareto optimal allocation (X0 − ξ∗,X1 + ξ∗)). Given p ∈ [p0(ξ∗),p1(ξ∗)],
this quantity clearly decomposes into w = w0 + w1, where wi is the utility gain of agent i
from the risk exchange deﬁned by
wi := Ui (ξi) − Ui (Xi) , ξ0 := X0 − (ξ∗ − p), ξ1 := X0 + (ξ∗ − p).
In the special case w = 0, the initial risk endowment (X0,X1) is an optimal risk sharing
allocation. In this case, it is optimal not to exchange any amount of risk.
If w > 0, i.e. p0(ξ∗) < p1(ξ∗), then the exchange of the amount of risk ξ∗ is possible
between Agents 0 and 1, and the choice of the price p ∈ [p0(ξ∗),p1(ξ∗)] corresponding to
this transaction depends on the market power of the agents :
(i) If Agent 0 has the power to design the contract and to impose it as a take-it-or-leave-
it proposal to Agent 1, then Agent 0 will impose the largest price p = p1(ξ∗) so that the
utility of Agent 1 is not decreased by the exchange, i.e. U1(X1 + ξ∗ − p) = U1(X1). This
is the point of view of Barrieu and ElKaroui [3, 4, 5, 6]. In practice, Agent 1 then has no
incentive to proceed to such a risk exchange as her utility is not altered. Since Agent 0 is
interested in the exchange, she should rather propose the price pε = p1(ξ∗)−εw for some
small parameter ε > 0, so that the utility of Agent 1 is strictly increased by the exchange
in order to give some incentive to agent 1.
(ii) In contrast to the preceding argument relying on the paradigm of rational expecta-
tions, the behavioral viewpoint tells us a very diﬀerent story about the parameter ε > 0
introduced above. For example, the experiments on the ultimatum game reveal that Agent
0 should choose the parameter ε above of the order of 0.3 or 0.4. See [11], [30], and [35] for
further details on this issue. Of course, the value of ε depends strongly on the design of
these experiments, and the real-life situation to which the present model is applied. The
ultimatum game is a rather diﬀerent situation than the setting covered by the subsequent
examples of this paper, where it seems appropriate to expect a more rational behavior of
the agents.
164 Super-gradient of law-invariant monetary utility functions
The main purpose of this section is to prove Proposition 3.1. By Theorem 3.1, Pareto
optimal allocations are the solutions of the optimization problem U0￿U1, and are charac-
terized in terms of the super-gradient of the concave functions Ui for i = 0,1.
We ﬁrst need to extend the notion of law-invariance for functions deﬁned on (L∞)∗. A
measure preserving transformation of (Ω,F,P) is a bi-measurable bijection τ : (Ω,F,P) →
(Ω,F,P) leaving P invariant, i.e., τ(P) = P. The transformation τ induces an isometric
isomorphism on L∞(P), still denoted by τ, deﬁned by τ(ξ) = ξ ◦ τ for every ξ ∈ L∞. The
transpose of τ : L∞ → L∞, denoted by τ∗, deﬁnes an isometry on (L∞)∗ via
 τ∗(µ),ξ  =  µ,τ(ξ)  for every µ ∈ (L∞)∗ and ξ ∈ L∞ .
A function f : (L∞)∗ −→ R is called law invariant if f = f ◦ τ∗ for every measure
preserving transformation τ : (Ω,F,P) → (Ω,F,P).
The statement of our ﬁrst result requires to extend the notion of comonotonicity to
bounded ﬁnitely additive measures.
Deﬁnition 4.1. Let ξ be a random variable with ξ+ ∈ L∞, and µ ∈ (L∞)
∗ with (unique)
decomposition µ = µr + µs into a countably additive measure µr = Z · P (regular part)
and a purely ﬁnitely additive measure µs (singular part). We say that µ is comonotone to
(resp. increases with) ξ, and we write µ ∼c ξ (resp. µ ր ξ), if
(i) Z is comonotone to (resp. increase with) ξ, and
(ii) µs is concentrated on {ξ = ess−sup ξ} in the sense that µs [{ξ > ess−sup ξ − ε}] =
 µs ba for every ε > 0.
We start by considering law-invariant monetary utility functions, before specializing the
discussion to the comonotone case.
Lemma 4.1. Let U be a law-invariant monetary utility function, ξ ∈ L∞, and let µ ∈
(L∞)
∗ be in ∂U(ξ). Then
(i) −µ ∼c ξ,
(ii) E[µ|G] ∈ ∂U(ξ) for any sub-sigma-algebra G of F with σ(ξ) ⊂ G.
In particular, −E[µ|ξ] ր ξ and E[Z|ξ] ∈ ∂U(ξ).
Proof. Fix µ ∈ ∂U(ξ) with decomposition µ = µr + µs into its regular part µr and its
singular part µs. By deﬁnition of the supergradient, we have U(ξ) =  µ,ξ  + V (µ) =
inf { ν,ξ  + V (ν) : ν ∈ (L∞)
∗}.
1. We ﬁrst prove that −µs is concentrated on {ξ = ess−sup ξ} in the sense of Def-
inition 4.1. To do this, we assume to the contrary that −µs is not concentrated on
17{ξ = ess−sup ξ}, and we construct a measure preserving transformation τ : (Ω,F,P) −→
(Ω,F,P) such that
µ1 := µ ◦ τ∗ satisﬁes  µ1,ξ  <  µ,ξ . (4.1)
By the law-invariance of V (inherited from U), this implies that U(ξ) =  µ,ξ  + V (µ) >
 µ1,ξ  + V (µ) =  µ1,ξ  + V (µ1) ≥ U(ξ), a contradiction.
We shall denote Aγ := {ξ < ess−inf ξ + γ} for every γ > 0. If −µs is not concentrated
on {ξ = ess−sup ξ}, then
α := µs [Ω \ A2ε] > 0 for some ε > 0,
and we may ﬁnd two sequences (Bn)n≥1 ⊂ (Ω \ A2ε) and (Cn)n≥1 ⊂ Aε such that
P[Bn] = P[Cn] ≤
1
n
while µs[Bn] = α and µs[Cn] = 0.
Next, let τn : (Ω,F,P) −→ (Ω,F,P) be a bijective measure preserving transformation
such that τn(Bn) = Cn, τn(Cn) = Bn, and τn = Id on Ω \ (Bn ∪ Cn). Set νn := µ ◦ τ∗
n,
¯ µ := µs1Ω\A2ε, ¯ µn := ¯ µ ◦ τ∗
n. Observing that  ¯ µ ba = α, we directly estimate that
lim
n→∞ µ − νn,ξ  = lim
n→∞ ¯ µ − ¯ µn,ξ  + lim
n→∞ (µr − µr
n)1Bn∪Cn,ξ 
= lim
n→∞ ¯ µ − ¯ µn,ξ  ≤ α(ε − 2ε) < 0,
so that µ1 := νn, for a suﬃciently large integer n, satisﬁes (4.1).
2. Let G be any sub-σ−algebra of F. Since µ ∈ dom(V ), it follows from Lemma 3.3
in [29] that µ1 := E[µ|G] ∈ dom(V ), and V (µ) ≥ V (µ1) by the convexity and the
σ ((L∞)∗,L∞)−lower semi-continuity of V . Since  µ,ξ  =  µ1,ξ  if ξ is G−measurable,
this shows that assertion (ii) of the proposition holds true for every sub-σ-algebra G ⊃ σ(ξ).
3. Let Z1 be the density with respect to P of the regular part µr
1 of the measure µ1 = E[µ|G].
To prove (i), let νξ be a random variable deﬁned on (Ω,F,P), uniformly distributed on
(0,1), such that −ξ = q−ξ (νξ). Deﬁne Z2 := qZ1 (νξ) and µ2 := Z2 · P + µs. Observe that
Z1 =d Z2 and µ2 ∼c −ξ. Then, whenever the pair (−µ,ξ) is not comonotone, it follows
from the law-invariance of U and V that U(ξ) =  µ,ξ  + V (µ) >  µ2,ξ  + V (µ2) ≥ U(ξ).
This contradiction shows that (i) holds true. The ﬁnal assertion of the Lemma follows
from (ii), and the fact that −h(ξ) := −E[µ|ξ] is comonotone with ξ iﬀ the measurable
function h : R −→ R can be chosen to be non-decreasing. ✷
We next specialize the discussion to the comonotone case. Recall from Theorem 2.3
that comonotone law-invariant monetary utility functions have a quantile representation
in terms of a concave non-decreasing function in Cց. For µ ∈ (L∞)
∗, we shall denote
ϕµ(0) := 0 and ϕµ(t) :=  µs ba −
Z t
0
q−Z(α)dα, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, (4.2)
18where µ = Z · P + µs is the decomposition of µ into a regular part, with density Z with
respect to P, and a singular part µs.
Lemma 4.2. Let U(ξ) :=
R




∗ : ϕµ ∈ Cց , ϕµ ≤ ¯ ϕ and qξ is ﬂat on {ϕµ < ¯ ϕ}
￿
.
Proof. Let µ0 ∈ ∂U(ξ). By deﬁnition, the super-gradient of U consists of all minimizers
in the variational representation of Theorem 2.3, i.e.
U(ξ) = inf
µ∈(L∞)∗  µ,ξ  + V (µ) =  µ0,ξ  + V (µ0). (4.3)
By Lemma 4.1, we have µ0 ∼c −ξ. Let νξ be a random variable deﬁned on (Ω,F,P)
uniformly distributed on (0,1) such that ξqξ (νξ), and set Z1 := qZ (νξ), µ1 := Z1 ·P+µs
0.






which provides by a direct integration by parts :
Z 1
0
(ϕµ0 − ¯ ϕ)(t)dqξ(t) + (qξ(0+) − qξ(0))(ϕµ0 − ¯ ϕ)(0+) = 0.
By Theorem 2.3, ϕµ0 ≤ ¯ ϕ. Then, the above equality holds if and only if qξ is ﬂat on
{ϕµ0 < ¯ ϕ}. ✷
Remark 4.1. Comparing with Carlier and Dana [12] and F¨ ollmer and Schied [25], we
see that comonotone law-invariant monetary utility functions are identiﬁed with convex
distortions of probability measures, or equivalently with concave homogeneous Choquet
integrals. In particular, the above Lemma 4.2 is a slight extension of Corollary 2 in [12]
(they only consider the case where ¯ ϕ is a strictly concave increasing diﬀerentiable function
with ¯ ϕ(0) = 0 and ¯ ϕ(1) = 1 so that the singular part of the elements of the subgradient
are zero). In the present context, it is however important to make sure that ∂U(ξ)  = ∅,
so that it is necessary to deﬁne this super-gradient on the topological dual (L∞)
∗ instead
of L1(P). When both monetary utility functions are comonotone and law-invariant, there
is no guarantee for the existence of an element of the super-gradient in L1(P), whenever
the associated concave function ¯ ϕ ∈ Cց exhibits a jumps at zero.
We are now ready for the
Proof of Proposition 3.1 (i) =⇒ (ii) By Theorem 3.1, (ξ0,ξ1) ∈ A(X) is a Pareto
optimal allocation if and only if −ξi ∈ ∂Vi(¯ µ) for some ¯ µ ∈ (L∞)∗.
1. We ﬁrst observe that this implies that −X ∈ ∂(V0 +V1)(¯ µ), and by the Fenchel duality
relation, ¯ µ ∈ ∂(U0￿U1)(X). By Lemma 4.1, we deduce that µ := E[¯ µ|X] ∈ ∂(U0￿U1)(X),
which implies that µ ∈ ∂U0(ξ0) ∩ ∂U1(ξ1) by Lemma 6.2 below. By Lemma 4.1 (ii), this
implies that −µ ∼c ξ0 and −µ ∼c ξ1.
192. Since µ ∈ ∂Ui(ξi), we have Ui(ξi) =
R 1
0 qξi(t)ϕ′
µ(t)dt for i = 0,1. By Lemma 2.2, this
shows that (ξ0,ξ1) is a Pareto optimal allocation if and only if
Z 1
0









where we used the fact that qξ0 + qξ1 = qξ0+ξ1 as ξ0 ∼c ξ1. Integrating by parts, this
provides the equivalent characterization :
Z 1
0
(ϕµ − ¯ ϕ0 ∧ ¯ ϕ1)dqX(t) = 0. (4.4)
Since ϕµ ≤ ¯ ϕ0 ∧ ¯ ϕ1 by Lemma 4.2, this implies that ϕµ = ¯ ϕ0 ∧ ¯ ϕ1 on B := {dqX(.) > 0},
and
qξi is ﬂat on B ∩ {ϕµ < ¯ ϕi} = B ∩ {¯ ϕ1−i < ¯ ϕi} for each i = 0,1. (4.5)
For t ∈ Bc∩{¯ ϕ1 < ¯ ϕ0}, it follows from Lemma 4.2 that ϕµ(t) < ¯ ϕ0(t) and qξ0 is ﬂat at the
point t. Recalling that qξ0 +qξ1 = qX by the comonotonicity of (ξ0,ξ1), and the deﬁnition
of Bc, this implies that qξ1 is also ﬂat at the point t. Applying the same argument for
points in Bc ∩ {¯ ϕ0 < ¯ ϕ1}, we see that
qξ0 and qξ1 are ﬂat on Bc ∩ {¯ ϕ0  = ¯ ϕ1}. (4.6)
Hence (4.4) is equivalent to (4.5)-(4.6).
(ii) =⇒ (i) Let νX be a random variable on (Ω,F,P)uniformly distributed on (0,1) such
that X = qX(νX). Let (ξ0,ξ1) be a pair in Aր(X) satisfying (ii). Then ξi = fi(X) for
some non-decreasing maps fi, i = 0,1. Set ¯ ϕ := ¯ ϕ0 ∧ ¯ ϕ1, and deﬁne µ := ¯ ϕ(0+)δ0 (νX) +
¯ ϕ′(U)1(0,1](U), where δ0 is the Dirac mass at 0. By construction, we have ϕµ = ¯ ϕ with
the notation of (4.2), and we immediately check that ϕµ ≤ ¯ ϕi, i = 0,1, and −µ increases
with ξ0 and ξ1. By Lemma 4.2, it follows that µ ∈ ∂U0(ξ0) ∩ ∂U1(ξ1) so that (ξ0,ξ1)
satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition for the optimization problem U0￿U1. ✷
5 Strict risk aversion conditionally on lower-tail events
This section is dedicated to the proof of Proposition 3.2. The crucial arguments are
isolated in the two following lemmas.
Lemma 5.1. Let U be a law-invariant monetary utility function which is strictly risk
averse conditionally on lower tail events. Let (ξ,Z) ∈ L∞×L1(P) be such that Z ∈ ∂U(ξ).
Assume that P[Z = ess−sup Z] > 0. Then ξ is a.s. constant on the set {Z = ess−sup Z}.
Proof. Let (ξ,Z) ∈ L∞ × L1(P) with Z ∈ ∂U(ξ). By Theorem 2.1 and Lemma 4.1, we
have
U(ξ) = E[Zξ] + V (Z) and −Z ∼c ξ . (5.1)
20Suppose further that the set A := {Z = ess−sup Z} has positive P−measure. In order to
prove the required result, we shall assume to the contrary that ξ is not constant on A, and
work towards a contradiction. Since (ξ,−Z) is comonotone, it follows that A ∈ F↓(ξ).
Since U is strictly risk averse conditionally on lower tail events, we conclude that
U(ξ) < U(˜ ξ) where ˜ ξ := ξ1Ac + E[ξ|A]1A . (5.2)
Observing that E[Z˜ ξ] = E[Zξ], it follows from the concavity of U that
U(˜ ξ) ≤ U(ξ) + E[Z(˜ ξ − ξ)] = U(ξ),
thus contradicting (5.2). ✷
Lemma 5.2. Let U be a strictly monotone monetary utility function, and consider some
pair (ξ,Z) ∈ L∞ × L1(P) with Z ∈ ∂U(ξ). Then Z > 0 P−a.s.
Proof. For (ξ,Z) ∈ L∞ × L1(P) with Z ∈ ∂U(ξ), and A := {Z = 0}, it follows from the
concavity of U that U (ξ + 1A) ≤ U(ξ) + E[Z1A] = U(ξ). This implies that P[A] = 0 by
the strict monotonicity of U. ✷
We are now ready for the
Proof of Proposition 3.2 Let (ξ0,ξ1) ∈ Aր(X) be a Pareto optimal allocation. By
Theorem 3.1, there exists some µ ∈ (L∞)∗ such that
µ ∈ ∂U0(ξ0) ∩ ∂U1(ξ1). (5.3)
1. We ﬁrst prove that (ξ0,ξ1) = (−(X − κ)−,κ ∨ X) as in the statement of the proposition,
for some κ ∈ R. By Lemma 4.1, we have −µ ∼c ξi, i = 0,1, and the associated non-
decreasing concave function satisﬁes




∧ 1, t ∈ [0,1].
In particular, this implies that ϕµ(0+) = 0, and therefore µ = Z · P for some Z ∈ L1(P).
Moreover, since U1 is strictly monotone, it follows from the comonotonicity of the pairs
(−Z,ξi), i = 0,1, together with Lemma 5.2 that Z > 0 P−a.s. Then, there exists β ∈ [0,1)
such that {ϕµ < ¯ ϕ0} = (β,1). By Lemma 4.2, we see that
qξ0 is constant on [β,1]. (5.4)
Since U1 is strictly risk-averse conditionally on lower tail events, it follows again from the
comonotonicity of the pairs (−Z,ξi), i = 0,1, together with Lemma 5.1 that
qξ1 is constant on [0,β]. (5.5)
Since qX = qξ0 + qξ1, by the comonotonicity of the pair (ξ0,ξ1). By (5.4) and (5.5), the
Pareto allocation (ξ0,ξ1) = (−(X − κ)−,κ ∨ X) as in the statement of the proposition,
21for some κ ∈ [ess−inf X,ess−sup X].
2. It remains to prove the uniqueness statement. By the previous step, all Pareto
optimal allocations are of the form (ξ0(κ),ξ1(κ)) = (−(X − κ)−,κ ∨ X) for some κ ∈
[ess−inf X,ess−sup X]. Suppose that (ξ0(κ),ξ1(κ)) and (ξ0(κ′),ξ1(κ′)) are two Pareto op-
timal allocations for some κ,κ′ ∈ [ess−inf X,ess−sup X]. Then, 2
￿¯ ξ0, ¯ ξ1
￿
:= (ξ0(κ),ξ1(κ))
+ (ξ0(κ′),ξ1(κ′)) is also a Pareto optimal allocation, and therefore
￿¯ ξ0, ¯ ξ1
￿
= (ξ0(κ′′),ξ1(κ′′))
for some κ′′ ∈ [ess−inf X,ess−sup X] by the ﬁrst part of this proof. This in turn implies
that (ξ0(κ),ξ1(κ)) = (ξ0(κ′),ξ1(κ′)) = (ξ0(κ′′),ξ1(κ′′)) a.s. ✷
6 Existence of Pareto optimal allocations
for law-invariant monetary utility functions
6.1 A duality argument
We ﬁrst prove the existence of a Pareto optimal allocation in A(X) by means of duality
arguments. This provides a partial proof of Theorem 3.2 which states in addition that a
Pareto optimal allocation exists in the smaller set Aր(X).
By Theorem 3.1, for given X ∈ L∞, Pareto optimal allocations are characterized as the
solutions of the maximization problem
U0￿U1(X) = sup
(ζ0,ζ1)∈A(X)
U0(ζ0) + U1(ζ1). (6.1)
Recall from Section 2.2 that dom(U0￿U1) = L∞ for law-invariant monetary utility func-
tions U0 and U1. Also, since U0￿U1 is a monetary utility function, it is continuous with
respect to the L∞−norm, and therefore (L∞)∗ ⊃ ∂ (U0￿U1)(X)  = ∅, see Moreau [34].
Since U0￿U1 and V0 + V1 are conjugate, see Remark 2.2, we know from the Fenchel
duality relation that µ ∈ ∂(U0￿U1)(X) iﬀ −X ∈ ∂(V0 + V1)(µ).
We next claim that :
∂(V0 + V1)(µ) = ∂V0(µ) + ∂V1(µ). (6.2)
A direct proof of this claim for the case of law-invariant monetary utility functions is
possible but somewhat technical. For ease of presentation, we report in Subsection 6.2 a




duality, and provides as a by-product the existence of a Pareto optimal
allocation in the smaller set Aր(X). As a by-product, we obtain Lemma 6.2 which states
that the existence statement is actually equivalent to the identity (6.2) which, in particular,
yields a proof for (6.2). Notice that that the law-invariance assumption cannot be dropped,
as shown in Subsection 6.3 below.
22We then deduce from (6.2) the existence of a pair (ξ0,ξ1) ∈ L∞×L∞ such that ξ0+ξ1 =
X and −ξi ∈ ∂Vi(µ) for i = 0,1. Using again the Fenchel duality relation, we conclude
that µ ∈ ∂U0(ξ0) ∩ ∂U1(ξ1), which precisely says that the pair (ξ0,ξ1) solves the ﬁrst
order condition for the problem (6.1), see Theorem 3.1. Hence, (ξ0,ξ1) is a Pareto optimal
allocation.
6.2 A direct existence argument
In this section, we provide a complete proof of Theorem 3.2, and we obtain as a by-product
a justiﬁcation of (6.2).
We ﬁrst start by proving that the maximization problem in the deﬁnition of the sup-
convolution U0￿U1 can be restricted to pairs (ξ0,ξ1) ∈ Aր(X).
Lemma 6.1. Let U0 and U1 be two law-invariant monetary utility functions. Then
U0￿U1(X) = sup
(ξ0,ξ1)∈Aր(X)
U0(ξ0) + U1(ξ1). (6.3)
Proof. ∗ We ﬁrst recall that any attainable allocation (ξ0,ξ1) ∈ A(X) is dominated
by some comonotone attainable allocation (ˆ ξ0, ˆ ξ1) ∈ A(X) in the sense of second order
stochastic dominance. This result was proved by Landsberger and Meilijson [33] in the
context of a ﬁnite probability space, and further extended to L∞ allocations in a general
probability space by Dana and Meilijson [14].
By Corollary 4.59 in [25], any law-invariant monetary utility function preserves second





≥ Ui (ξi) .
Hence the maximization problem in the deﬁnition of U0￿U1 can be restricted to subset of
A(X) consisting of comonotone pairs (ξ0,ξ1). As in Section 3.2 above, we conclude that
this subset is precisely Aր(X). ✷
We are now ready for the
Proof of Theorem 3.2 Let (ξn
0,ξn
1)n be a maximizing sequence of U0￿U1(X). By





1 (X) for some non-decreasing functions fn
0 ,fn
1 : [a,b] −→ R, where [a,b] :=
[ess−inf X,ess−sup X] is the range of the (bounded) random variable X. By possibly
adding a constant to ξn
0, we may assume ess−inf ξn
0 = 0. From the equality ξn
0+ξn
1 = X, we
see that 0 ≤ fn
0 ≤ b−a and a ≤ fn
1 ≤ b. Hence, for each n ≥ 1, fn
0 ∈ B := {f : [a,b] −→ R,
∗We are grateful to Beatrice Acciaio for pointing out to us a gap in a previous proof of this lemma.
23|f| ≤ b−a, f and Id−f are non-decreasing}. Observe that any function in B is 1−Lipschitz
continuous. Then B is a bounded closed equicontinuous family, and it follows from the
Ascoli Theorem that, after possibly passing to a subsequence, fn
0 −→ f0 uniformly on
[a,b] for some f0 ∈ B. This implies that fn
1 −→ f1 := Id − f0 uniformly on [a,b]. By
the L∞−continuity of U0 and U1, we have U0￿U1(X) = limn→∞ U0(ξn
0) + U1(ξn
1) =
U0 (f0(X)) + U1 (f1(X)) so that (f0(X),f1(X)) is the required maximizer. ✷
We conclude this section by proving that the crucial identity (6.2) is in fact equivalent to
the existence of Pareto optimal allocation, which has been proved in Subsection 6.2 under
the law-invariance assumption. With this result, this justiﬁes the duality-based existence
argument reported in the beginning of Section 6.
Lemma 6.2. Let U0,U1 be two concave functions from L∞ to R, and assume that U0￿U1
is upper semi-continuous and dom(U0￿U1) = L∞. Then, the following statements are
equivalent :
(i) for all X ∈ L∞, U0￿U1(X) = U0(ξ0) + U1(ξ1) for some (ξ0,ξ1) ∈ A(X),
(ii) for all µ ∈ (L∞)
∗, we have ∂(V0 + V1)(µ) = ∂V0(µ) + ∂V1(µ).
Proof. (ii)=⇒(i) : Under (ii), the argument in the beginning of this section provides the
required existence result.
(i)=⇒(ii) : For µ ∈ (L∞)
∗, the inclusion ∂V0(µ) + ∂V1(µ) ⊆ ∂(V0 + V1)(µ) is always
true. If ∂(V0 + V1)(µ) = ∅, then the previous inclusion implies that ∂V0(µ) + ∂V1(µ) =
∂(V0 +V1)(µ) = ∅. We next assume that ∂(V0 +V1)(µ)  = ∅, and we intend to prove that,
under (i), ∂(V0+V1)(µ) ⊆ ∂V0(µ)+∂V1(µ). For X ∈ ∂(V0+V1)(µ), it follows from (i) that
U0￿U1(X) = U0(ξ0) + U1(ξ1) for some (ξ0,ξ1) ∈ A(X). From the proof of (ii) ⇐⇒ (iii)
of Theorem 3.1 together with Remark 3.2, we see that Vi(µ) = Ui(ξi) −  µ,ξi , i = 0,1.
Hence ξi ∈ ∂Vi(µ) and therefore X = ξ0 + ξ1 ∈ ∂V0(µ) + ∂V1(µ). ✷
6.3 Law-invariance and existence of Pareto optimal allocations
We now show that the assumption of law-invariance in Theorem 3.2 can not be dropped.
Example 6.1. This example was triggered by a question of N. El Karoui, and shows
that, even in a ﬁnite-dimensional setting, it may happen that the set of Pareto optimal
allocations is empty for any possible aggregate risk X ∈ L∞. Let U1 be given by the
entropic utility function : U1(ξ) := −lnE[exp(−ξ)], ξ ∈ L∞. It is well-known that the
domain of its conjugate is included in L1(P), and V1(Z) := E[Z lnZ]χZ(Z), Z ∈ L1.
Let Z0 be any density in Z with P[Z0 = 0] > 0, and such that V1(Z0) < ∞. One checks
that ∂V1(Z0) = ∅. Deﬁne the utility of Agent 0 by U0(ξ) := E[Z0ξ], ξ ∈ L∞. The domain
of its conjugate is included in L1(P), and V0(Z) := χ{Z0}(Z), Z ∈ L1.
24Since Z0 ∈ dom(V0) ∩ dom(V1), it follows from Lemma 2.1 that dom(U0￿U1) = L∞.
Given a total risk X ∈ L∞, it follows from 3.1 (iii) that any Pareto optimal allocation
(ξ0,ξ1) ∈ A(X) must satisfy ξi ∈ ∂Vi(Z), which implies that Z = Z0 and ξ1 ∈ ∂V1(Z0).
This can not happen as ∂V1(Z0) = ∅.
Example 6.2. In this example due to F. Delbaen [20], we show that the set of Pareto
optimal allocations might be empty in the context where all monetary utility functions
U0, U1, U0￿U1, are positively-homogeneous, and have the Fatou property.
Let {(B0
t ,B1
t ), t ≥ 0} be a standard Brownian motion in R2 deﬁned on (Ω,F,F,P),
where F = {Ft,t ≥ 0} is the natural ﬁltration (with the usual conditions) generated by
(B0,B1). For i = 0,1, let Mi denote the subset of L1(P) formed by the densities of
the probability measures Q, absolutely continuous with respect to P, such that Bi is a
Brownian motion under Q. The monetary utility functions Ui are deﬁned by
Ui(ξ) := inf
Q∈Mi EQ[ξ], ξ ∈ L∞(P), i = 0,1.
It is shown in [20] that
Ui(ξ) = max
￿
a : a + (H · Bi)∞ ≤ ξ for some H ∈ Hi￿
and U0￿U1(ξ) = EP[ξ],
where Hi is the collection of all predictable Bi−integrable processes such that the process
{(H · Bi)t,t ≥ 0} is bounded.
Deﬁne the total risk
X := B0
T + B1




t | = 1
￿
.
Clearly X ∈ L∞ and U0￿U1(X) = EP[X] = 0. We now suppose that one can ﬁnd a pair
(ξ0,ξ1) ∈ A(X) such that U0(ξ0) + U1(ξ1) = 0, and work towards a contradiction.






∞ ≤ X for some (H0,H1) ∈ H0 × H1 . (6.4)
On the other hand, we know from the martingale representation theorem that the only
B−integrable predictable integrands K = (K0,K1) such that Ki·Bi are bounded in L2(P)
and K · B ≤ X are (up to indistinguishability) K0 = K1 = 1(0,T]. Hence we must have
H0 = H1 = 1(0,T], which is in contradiction with (6.4) as Hi  ∈ Hi.
APPENDIX : Proof of Lemma 3.1
(i) For ξ ∈ L∞, and A ∈ F↓(ξ), set ˜ ξ := ξ1Ac + E[ξ|A]1A, and observe that there exists











25We then directly compute that







This shows that, whenever ¯ ϕ′ is constant near the origin, there exists ξ ∈ L∞ such that
U(˜ ξ) − U(ξ) = 0 for suﬃciently small α. Conversely, assume that ¯ ϕ is not linear on [0,α]








¯ ϕ′(s)ds for t ∈ [0,α],
and observe that ψ(0) = 0, ψ(α) = 1, ψ is continuous, concave on [0,α], and ψ is not
linear. Then ψ(t) ≥ α−1t, 0 ≤ t ≤ α, and λ
￿
{t ∈ [0,α] : ψ(t) > α−1t}
￿
> 0. Since
qξ(0) < qξ(α), It follows from an integration by parts that







































(ii) For ξ,ζ ∈ L∞, it follows from the super-linearity of U that U(ξ + ζ) ≥ U(ξ) + U(ζ).
Then U is strictly monotone if and only if U(ξ) > 0 for every ξ ∈ L∞
+ \{0}. For any such a
ξ, let β := inf{s > 0 : qξ(s) > 0}. Since U(ξ) =
R 1
β qξ(s)¯ ϕ′(s)ds, the required equivalence
follows from the fact that ¯ ϕ′(1) = 1 and ¯ ϕ is continuous at the point 1. ✷
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